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ABSTRACT 
Some economists argue that modern industrial societies must respond to ecological challenges 
by learning to live with diminishing economic growth. Yet it also seems that low growth 
societies are doomed to struggle with problems of  social instability caused by economic 
recession, unemployment and a decline in social entitlements. In “Reason, Morality and Skill” 
John Stopford draws on Ancient Greek economic thought, including Aristotle’s views on the 
natural limitation of  wealth, to discuss the problem of  human flourishing in ecologically 
challenged societies. Economic capability theorists, influenced by the work of  Sen and 
Nussbaum, have recently argued that the transition from a growth driven economy focused on 
consumption to a stable low growth economy requires us to redefine prosperity as capability 
development “within limits”. Stopford argues that to understand prosperity in this way we need 
to reexamine the role of  skill in the development of  capabilities. The marginalization of  skill 
has become a systematic feature of  modern industrial and consumer societies. Yet certain kinds 
of  skill, exemplified in the work of  the autonomously productive craftsman, are necessary to 
the development of  the bounded capabilities that low growth societies need to foster. 
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In this paper I discuss the relationship between reason, morality, and skill in a well-
ordered liberal democracy.2  I argue that while skill played an important role in the 
ethical life of  the ancient world, the marginalization of  skill and craftsmanship has 
blinded us to the importance of  a public culture of  skill in the modern world. This 
applies, in particular, to the public role of  skill as one of  the “cultural conditions of  
autonomy” (and a fortiori of  political autonomy) in a liberal political regime 
                                                 
1 An early version of  this paper was read at the workshop on “Moral realism and political 
decisions: a new framework of  practical rationality for contemporary multicultural Europe" 
organized by members of  the Universities of  Bamberg and Trieste in Bamberg, Germany, on 19 
- 22 December 2013. I would like to thank the organizers, Professor Gabriele De Anna of  the 
University of  Bamberg, and Professor Riccardo Martinelli of  the University of  Trieste, for the 
opportunity to participate in the workshop. The methodological framework of  my discussion is 
“political not metaphysical” in the sense of  Rawls (1985; 1996, 10). For this reason I focus 
mainly on questions of  practical rationality, leaving all but the most important metaphysical 
and epistemological issues to one side.  
2 I use “well-ordered” in the sense of Rawls (1971, 4-5) to refer to a society that is effectively 
regulated by a public conception of justice. 
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(Stopford 2009, 39-45).  Not only do citizens need certain basic kinds of  skill to 
express their autonomy. Such skills may also contribute to the capacity for 
“flourishing within limits” that some ecological economists regard as a key factor in 
the development of  sustainable human societies.3 
Skillful work shaped the cultural life of  the archaic Greek world. The craft 
worker was an established figure in the community, honored for their 
contributions to a commodious life. The public craftsman or  demioergos 
(δημιουργός - Homer’s word) was “a bringer of  civilization,” distinguished by 
competence and know-how, the member of  a community of  skilled producers 
whose focus was on quality and doing good work (Sennett 2008, 25). Craft workers 
acquired their know-how in long and painstaking apprenticeships, developing and 
modifying their skills throughout their lives (25-26). 
The work of  the demioergos was more than a job. Someone who does a job does 
not produce a work.  But what was the work of  the public producer in Greece? 
Philosophical phrases such as “form-giving activity”, which we associate with the 
production of  works, are not informative if  we are interested in understanding 
how a work comes into existence (in German: wie es entsteht). How can we study 
“form-giving activity”? Producing things involves a number of  related but 
distinct skills that even the producer may not always be aware of  using.  
Sculpting, molding, weaving, embossing, and whittling engage maker and material 
in ways that are often inscrutable. 
Skillful activity tends to be “transparent” (durchsichtig) in the sense of  
Heidegger (Heidegger 1927, 146; 1962, 187).  The more competent we become in 
exercising a skill, the less we may notice ourselves as we exercise it. Skill may be 
all but invisible to an onlooker. Everyday language lacks words to describe the 
subtleties of  skillful activity. The Latinized expressions “form,” “product,” 
“creation,” or “product” shed little light on the engaged material consciousness of  
the demioergos. Evocative expressions such as “the necessary poetry of  things” 
(MacGregor 2010) work at the level of  metaphor but may miss something that is 
important about crafting with one’s hands.  
Although the public status of  the demioergoi was in decline by the 4th century 
BCE, craftsmanship and skill still exercised a decisive influence on the 
philosophers of  classical Greece: “[t]he craftsman lets kosmos appear through the 
artifact” (McEwen 1993, 73).  Plato’s hierarchy of  Reality pairs the various levels 
of  being with different kinds and qualities of  craftsmanship. “That which truly 
is” is the work of  the World Craftsman (demioergos) of  the Timaeus who endows 
the world with motion, order and beauty in order that it should thus participate 
in His goodness (Lavecchia 2012, 13).   Plato, his criticisms of  the poets 
notwithstanding, characterizes the true craftsman as someone who seeks the 
perfection of  that which he creates.  
                                                 
3 See Jackson (2009), Chapter 9.  
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In the early dialogues Plato often identifies craft with knowledge (Parry 1996, 
15).  In the Republic, it can be argued (though it is not a matter of  consensus) that 
Plato holds justice in its most developed form to be a craft (101), perhaps a 
“second-order craft” or “supercraft”.4 Surveying antiquity from a post-Cartesian 
perspective we sometimes suppose that representations and what they represent 
belong to discrete ontological orders. But for Plato, craftsmanship is the source of  
a seamless continuity between intellectual objects and the visible cosmos.  
Aristotle’s distinction between technê as poïesis (ποίησις) and praxis (πρᾶξις) 
seems to preclude the identification of virtue with craftsmanship. Craftsmanship 
involves the production of things --- bringing something forth --- rather than 
acting, far less acting rightly. And virtue produces not things but actions. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that virtue is not a craft. Scholars have 
inferred from this that it is a mistake to focus on the role of craft in Aristotle’s 
ethical theory.5 This does not imply that Aristotle’s view of ethics and practical 
reasoning is not influenced by a craft model, however (Angier 2010, 36), or that 
his views on craft are without significance for ethical and political theory. This 
holds, in particular, of any approach that is not committed to a rigid 
dichotomization of production and action. Thus Murphy asks if it is “really 
plausible that there is no moral dimension to production or that there are no 
techniques of action?” (Murphy 1993, 92).   
A craft and its products may be used for morally good or bad ends, and such 
ends are normally considered to be external to the craft. We do not charge a knife 
with a crime just because it is sharp. Skill and craftsmanship may be ethically 
significant in other ways, however. Murphy cites Rawls’s Aristotelian Principle 
(Rawls 1971, 426) to illustrate the importance of skill to human flourishing 
(εὐδαιμονία): “we are willing to undergo the stress of practice and learning [… 
because …] we anticipate the rewards of mastering complex new skills” (Murphy 
1993, 6). The ability to exercise skills, and in particular complex skills, is an 
important feature of a good life, even if attaining and maintaining them requires 
considerable effort. 
At another level, skill might be said to play a structural role in the ability to 
produce things autonomously. In this respect, a morally autonomous person can 
be compared to the skilled craft worker who both conceives and executes a plan. 
                                                 
4 Plato uses both demioergos and various cognate forms of technê (variously translated as ‘craft,’ 
‘skill,’ ‘expertise’ or ‘know-how’) in the Republic and elsewhere. On the translation of technê and 
the relation between technê and epistêmê see Parry (2014). Here I follow Parry (1996) in rejecting 
the view that craft is only instrumental in the Republic, and hence that virtue, which is desired 
for itself and not merely instrumentally, cannot be a craft. Angier, while concluding that Plato 
fails to develop the case for a “genuine virtue-techne,” thinks that Aristotle’s ethical views are 
nevertheless influenced by the craft model (Angier 2010, 1, 32). 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between craft (technê) and virtue (aretê) in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, see Parry 2014.  
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In such cases we can speak of the unity of conception and production (νόησις and 
ποίησις) (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1032b15; Murphy, 8). The dignity of skilled work 
depends on the ability of the worker to execute a plan they have themselves 
conceived (8).  The unskilled worker, by contrast, merely executes a plan that has 
been conceived by someone else.  
Once immersed in the productive dialectic of conception and execution, the 
skilled worker draws on the principles of their craft to solve problems of execution 
while reciprocally deepening their grasp of those principles on the basis of their 
experiences with a particular material (8). Producing things according to a plan 
that is one’s own not only leads to the development of more complex skills (8). 
When they work according to their own plan people learn to produce 
autonomously. “Through this dialectic of conception and execution we become 
autonomous subjects, rather than mere instruments, of labour” (8).  
Perhaps we can draw on this image of the craft worker to model the role of 
cultural skills in liberal democracy (Stopford, 2009, 39-45). The cultural 
conditions of autonomy are the practices, traditions and ways of doing things that 
constitute a cultural context within which autonomous choice is possible. Such 
practices and traditions are not simply given: they have a history, vary from 
culture to culture, and must be learned. The subjective cultural conditions of 
autonomy are the competences and skills that are implicit in an understanding of 
its objective conditions (40-41). When we act autonomously and make choices 
about how to live we do not reflect theoretically on the practices and traditions 
that form the cultural context of our choices: we simply engage that context 
skillfully, making use of the tools and materials that our culture provides. 
One of the consequences of the marginalization of skill is that public 
recognition of skill is reduced as the functions of conception and execution are 
distributed between different individuals and classes. Aristotle writes at a time 
when the publicly recognized skill of the demioergos was beginning to be 
marginalized, and the “hand” separated from the “head” (Sennett 2008, 23; 
Stopford 2011, 29). Aristotle sometimes replaces the traditional word for a craft 
worker, demioergos, with cheirotechnon (χειροτεχνῶν) --- “handworker” ---  arguing  
in the Metaphysics that “the architects [architektonikon] in every profession are 
more estimable and know more and are wiser than the artisans because they know 
the reasons of the things which are done” (Metaphysics, 981a30-b2; Sennett 23).6 
Such linguistic shifts not only confirm the division of intellectual and manual 
labour, but also the diminished public standing of the artisan: 
 
[…] while the work of  the artisan was admired, he was neglected or down-
graded as a person […]. And what is more important, there never was, except in 
                                                 
6 As quoted by Sennett 2008, 23.  ἀρχιτέκτονας is translated by Tredennick (1933, 7)  as “master 
craftsmen” rather than “architects”. 
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the constructions of  some theorists, like the town-planner and philosopher 
Hippodamus of  Miletus, any such thing as a category of  artisans” (Vidal-
Naquet 1977, 12). 
 
By the early 20th Century, proponents of  scientific management recommended 
shifting all planning activities from workers to management (Taylor 1917, 38; 
Murphy, 8).  For Taylor it is “clear that in most cases one type of  man is needed to 
plan ahead and an entirely different type to execute the work” (Taylor, 38).  
Taylor may have believed that there are inherent differences between people that 
make some more suited for conceptual work than others, a view that Adam Smith 
might well have rejected. Smith acknowledges in The Wealth of  Nations that the 
repetitive performance of  a small number of  simple tasks rather than innate 
deficiency is to blame for the mental and moral torpor of  the “labouring poor”, 
arguing that government should provide education to counteract these effects.7  
Here, as in his Theory of  Moral Sentiments, Smith accepts the human costs of  
the division of  labour and commercial society as the price of  economic growth and 
opulence, at least in its early stages. More recently, Rainer Marten has argued that 
the capacity for sympathetic identification married to the moral perspective of  
the “impartial spectator,” to which Smith appeals, is an unequal match for the 
disfiguring extremes of  Schumpeterian capitalism.8 Disruptive entrepreneurism 
cannot be tamed by feelings of  sympathy. When such feelings do perform a moral 
function it can only be from within a social scheme that has already been 
humanized in other ways (Marten 2009, 69).9 
To understand the characteristics of  such a scheme it is necessary to look 
deeper into our ideas about the relationship between skill and wealth. Both 
Xenophon and Aristotle view the wealth acquired and used by households as an 
instrument or tool (Booth 1993, 41).10  In The Economist, Xenophon’s Socrates 
refers to wealth as an “instrument” (ὄργανα χρήματα) that he has never possessed 
(Xenophon 1971, 13).11 In the same passage he compares the art of  using wealth 
                                                 
7 See Smith (1909), Book 5, especially Article II, “Of the Expense of the Institution for the 
Education of Youth” (485ff). 
8 See e.g. Schumpeter 1994,  83:  “This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact 
about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to 
live in.” 
9 But see Schumpeter 1954.  The question of the “coherence” of Smith’s economic and moral 
theories is too complex to present in the space available here. For a recent informative 
discussion of these issues, see the introduction to Haakonssen 2006.  
10 The fact that Aristotle sometimes treats money as conventional, and sometimes as a 
commodity like other commodities does not seem to detract from his underlying view that true 
wealth is “the knowledge how to use things rightly.” See Barker 1959, 380-381.  
11 On this interpretation of organa chremata see Booth (1993, 41). Booth notes that chremata is 
related to chreia suggesting “need” rather than demand, and cites Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
1097a28 and Politics1253b31-32 in support of this reading. Aristotle distinguishes oikonomia 
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to that of  performing on a musical instrument. To own a flute is to be able to play 
it. Without being able to play it one cannot own it.  There is also a second sense in 
which one may use a flute without being able to play it, for the purpose of  
exchange. “So it is clear to us that a flute in the hands of  a man who does not 
know how to use it, is not property to him, unless he sell it” (4). Wealth, we might 
likewise say, is useful in its primary sense when we know how to “play” it. 
While this may seem to involve a “high redefinition” of  “wealth”, it is a view 
that flows directly into Aristotle’s autarkic theory of  the household (Booth, 41). 
The needs of  the household for wealth are intrinsically self-limiting since “[n]o 
tool of  any art is without limit in either quantity or size, and wealth is a 
multitude of  tools for the arts of  ruling household and city” (Aristotle 1997, 
1256b26).12 The soul has its proper objects, with which recognizable limits are 
associated. Food, for example, is the proper object of  the nutritive soul. Its 
acquisition and use are governed by ethical requirements involving balance, 
proportion and the avoidance of  excess (Stopford 2011, 30). The modern “food 
system,” by contrast, decontextualizes food: as a vehicle for the delivery of  
nutrients to the body, on the one hand, and as a commodity with an exchange 
                                                                                                                                                                  
from chrematistics. Oikonomia, in the words of Daly and Cobb (1994, 138-139) deals with “the 
management of the household so as to increase its use value to all members of the household 
over the long run;” chrematistics concerns the “manipulation of property and wealth so as to 
maximize short-term monetary exchange value to the owner.” See also Anielski (2007, 23). 
Aristotle distinguishes at least two kinds of chrematistics, one of which uses money as a means 
of exchange for the sake of the goals of the household, while the other makes the acquisition of 
money an end in itself: “[t]hat is why it appears on the one hand that all wealth must have a 
limit and yet why on the other hand we see the opposite happening in fact. For all those 
engaged in business increase money without limit. The reason is the closeness between them. 
For the two uses of business, being of the same thing, overlap, since property has the same use 
in both cases but not in the same respect: while of the one use, something else is the end; of the 
other, the end is increase. As a result, it seems to some that increase is the work of the science of 
household management, and they end up thinking they must either preserve or increase their 
substance of money without limit.” People confuse the two kinds of business “because they are 
more serious about life than about good life (…). And if they cannot get what they want 
through business itself, they pervert everything else into business instead.” (Aristotle, 1997 
1257b-1258a). 
12 See Aristotle (1997, 1256b26): “So, one kind of the science of property is naturally part of the 
science of household management, and this property must either be present or the science must 
provide it so that it is present. It consists in a store of things necessary for life and useful to the 
community of city or household. And true wealth at any rate would seem to be made up of 
these things. For self-sufficiency in this sort of property with a view to good life is not 
unlimited, contrary to what Solon says in the line: ‘to wealth no limit has been laid down for 
human beings.’ For such a limit has been laid down, just as it has in the case of the other arts. 
No tool of any art is without limit in either quantity or size, and wealth is a multitude of tools 
for the arts of ruling household and city.” On the relation between Aristotle’s theory of the 
“natural limit” and his ethical views see Finley (1970). 
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value on the other.13 Here there is no room for skillful activity. The activities of  
production, storage and preparation, which were the focus of  the traditional 
household economy, are not essentially connected with consumption, which has 
become an abstract function without ethical constraints. Consumption and 
convenience, which formerly signified “fittedness” to the natural order, come to 
signify the kind of  ethically neutral ease of  use and access which makes skill 
disappear altogether (Stopford 2011, 30).  
Marx writes in his remarks on Xenophon (1843-45) that useful is “everything 
which one knows how to use” (Marx 1971, 391).14 Usefulness is not a natural or 
“real” property of  things, but a relational property that holds of  persons and 
things. A complete analysis of  the commodity in terms of  use and exchange values 
would have to take into account the skills and abilities involved in both types of  
value. Smith had originally discussed exchange value in the context of  his theory 
of  growth, tracing it back to a human “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” 
(Smith, 1909, 19).  His account inaugurates what Graeber calls the “founding myth 
of  economics” according to which money is introduced to replace barter. A 
successful barter system presupposes a “double coincidence of  wants” between 
parties.15 This occurs rarely enough to make the use of  money, which does not 
depend on such coincidences, an improvement. The “founding myth” thus provides 
a plausible explanation of  how money and subsequently credit arise out of  an 
original human propensity to barter and exchange (Graeber 2011, 22-24). 
Graeber questions the historical accuracy of  this account, since the balance of  
anthropological evidence suggests that barter-based economies of  this kind have 
never existed. Our familiarity with the distinction between exchange value and 
use value makes it easy to forget that to say something has a “use value” is also to 
say that someone knows how to use it. Here it is “knowing how to use” that it is 
primary and “use value” that is secondary. Just as Smith’s idea of  a “propensity 
to truck, barter, and exchange” may be more retrospective reconstruction than 
anthropological fact, so also our ideas about use value. To understand the meaning 
of  “use” we need to know more about the structure of  the skillful activities on 
which it is based.16  
Even Marx, who may have accepted some version of  the founding myth of  
barter, does not offer his followers an account of  the relationship between use and 
skill.17 The managers of  “real existing socialism” thus followed Western capitalism 
in regarding a certain fragmentation of  the labour process as a inevitable (Murphy 
                                                 
13 On the sociology of food, the “food system,” and “the world ‘behind’ our food” see Carolan 
2013, especially Introduction and Chapter 3. 
14 The translation of Marx is from Booth 1993, 250. 
15 A “double coincidence of wants” exists if and only if each party happens to be able to offer in 
exchange exactly what the other party wants to acquire. 
16 See Stopford 2009, 115-123, 148-60. 
17 On Marx’s view of barter in precapitalist economies see Booth 1993, 189-91. 
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1993, 10). The marginalization of  skillful activity thus gains momentum with 
industrialization. Deskilling and the disaggregation of  skills became pervasive, 
leading to a loss of  synergies between different kinds of  skillful activity (Stopford 
2011, 31). Economic policy divorces labour from its foundations in skill when it 
“fetishizes” macro-economic labour productivity as a criterion of  economic 
success (Jackson, 131-132).18  
This encourages the ongoing replacement of  human labour by machinery and 
“labour saving devices.” Even in societies that guarantee a reasonable social 
minimum, such arrangements deprive people of  a key opportunity for the 
development and exercise of  important skills (Stopford 2009, 120-123).19 The 
alternative to fetishizing labour productivity may not be inefficiency, however, but 
the discovery of  alternative configurations of  skill and particular technologies 
that allow people to engage in meaningful forms of  work (Jackson 2009, 132; 
Stopford 2009, 129-132).20 As Jackson notes, this does not mean that policies to 
enhance labour productivity must be abandoned under all circumstances. But 
focusing on macroeconomic labour productivity without reevaluating the 
traditional functions of  investment is “a recipe for undermining work, community 
and environment” (Jackson 2009, 132, 138).  
Economic institutions are a cultural force and culture is an economic force. If  
the fetishization of  labour productivity undermines the development of  skill it 
also detracts from the cultural conditions of  autonomy. The “social logic that 
locks people into materialistic consumerism as the basis for participating in the 
life of  society” (180) also affects their abilities to grasp and use the tools that their 
culture offers.  Wealth is not an end in itself, but a means that we must know how 
to use. It is for this reason that “the art of  using” (Booth 1993, 48) forms the core 
of  Aristotle’s theory of  the household: “knowing how to use suggests the art of  
acquiring and employing with a view to the right end” (49).  Since true wealth is 
acquired and used skillfully for a purpose it also has a natural limit which derives 
from that purpose. To acquire more than the natural limit prescribes is pointless. 
The art of  using wealth thus leads naturally to the idea of  a limit to the 
acquisition of  wealth and of  economic growth. 
Smith’s model of  economic growth, centered on the rational self-interested 
economic agent, the division of  labour, specialization, technological development 
and the extension of  markets, is viewed by many economists as unsustainable. 
Smith himself  acknowledges that economic growth will eventually end in a 
“stationary state”.21 Both Mill (1902, 334-340) and Keynes (1972, 326) believe 
                                                 
18 For further discussion of a “low growth” approach to labour productivity see Jackson 2011, 
101.  
19 On the “skillful self” see Stopford  2009, 45.  
20 On factors affecting the unity of conception and execution, including aptitudes, technology, 
worker expectations, and government policy see Murphy, 227-228. 
21 Smith 1909, 99-100.   
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that a society without economic growth is inevitable “in the long run.” Neither 
author views this prospect pessimistically. Such a society need not be dismal and 
may even hold out the prospect of  social, cultural, and moral progress.  
Jackson argues, however, that industrial nations face a “dilemma of  growth” 
that cannot be left to take care of  itself  in the long run. On the one hand 
economic expansion at present rates is unsustainable and modern industrial 
economies must learn to live with diminishing economic growth (Jackson 2009, 
14-15). On the other hand, “de-growth” is socially and political unstable. Societies 
that cannot maintain economic growth face the evils of  social instability 
associated “with declining consumer demand […] rising unemployment, falling 
competitiveness and a spiral of  recession” (65). 
Jackson suggests that the systematic bias towards macro-economic labour 
productivity in mature economies can be addressed by encouraging structural 
shifts in economic organization towards a “Cinderella economy” that is less 
material intensive and more labour intensive than economies that strive for a high 
labour productivity (130-132, 154, 194-197).  Such shifts to a low- or post-growth 
economy can be politically stable and ecologically sustainable if  they are wedded 
to a conception of  human prosperity that acknowledges limits. The conception of  
prosperity that Jackson proposes is based on a set of  central capabilities like that 
proposed by Martha Nussbaum, with the significant limitation that the goal of  
securing the central capabilities for each citizen must be compatible with 
economic and ecological criteria of  sustainability (45-47).   
Jackson follows Sen in rejecting theories that interpret the “living standard” 
in terms of  commodity command (opulence), utility, and blunt proxies such as 
gross domestic product: “Commodity command is a means to the end of  well-
being, but can scarcely be the end itself  [. . .]” (Sen 1985, 19).22  Sen argues that 
well-being is a matter of  how well someone is able to function rather than of  what 
commodities they command. Human  functioning with a given commodity bundle 
depends on a person’s ability to convert commodities into functioning, and this in 
turn may depend on a variety of  physiological, social, biographical, geographical 
and cultural factors (70-71). Seemingly egalitarian distributions of  resources may 
be unjust because they fail to capture the injustices that arise out of  such 
conversion inequalities. Nutritional policy, for example, should focus not on 
income or food as a commodity, but on the individual’s ability to be well-
nourished.  
While Sen goes on to develop this line of  argument in a way that emphasizes 
                                                 
22 The limitations of GDP as a measure of prosperity seem obvious when it is pointed out that a 
large prison population will increase it, whereas efficient and effective healthcare will tend to 
reduce it. The existence of economically unnecessary malnutrition in Western populations is an 
example of the way in which the affluence of a society tends to undermine assumptions on 
which welfarism is based. For discussion of the logic of abundance, the diminishing marginal 
utility of extra commodities, and the “life satisfaction paradox” see Jackson, Chapter 3, 40-41. 
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freedom, interpreted as capability to function rather than actual functioning, 
Nussbaum specifies a concrete list of  central human capabilities owed to each 
citizen of  a constitutional democracy. This list emphasizes both the broad range 
of  human capabilities and the material conditions for their development through 
legislation and social policy (Nussbaum 2000, 78-70; Stopford 2009, 133-134).   
One reason for drawing up such a detailed list may be practical: political theories 
should be concrete enough to make it possible to operationalize the idea of  
development. They must specify important functions in a way that facilitates 
practical applications (Jackson 2009, 44).   
Nussbaum’s list of  capabilities belongs to a “political” conception of  the 
person that excludes metaphysical pleading and seeks to achieve (taking Rawls’s 
political liberalism as its model) an “overlapping consensus” through cross-
cultural dialogue and democratic consultation (Nussbaum 2000, 74-75).23 The 
central capabilities embody what she calls “a partial ideal” of  truly human 
functioning, inspired by Aristotle and Marx, and by the idea that governments 
should not seek to shape citizens but rather put them in a position to shape their 
own lives (72).24 An important aim, which Nussbaum shares with Sen, is to 
overcome structural sources of  disempowerment such as adaptive preference to 
which welfarist and resourcist views are insensitive (114-115, 136-141).25    
The proposal to focus government and constitutional policy around a 
normative view of  political personhood exposes Nussbaum’s view to the charges 
of  perfectionism and paternalism (Stopford 2009, 133, 135-137).26 In addition, her 
prima facie prioritization of  individual functioning raises problems of  distributive 
justice that she cannot easily address (136, 146-148). In a move that Pogge 
characterizes as “inverted  Aristotelianism” Nussbaum claims extra social 
resources not for the better but for the worse endowed, since the worse endowed  
will be entitled to an increased share of  resources as part of  the adjustment for 
conversion inequality. The limits of  this redistributive project are unclear, since 
neither Nussbaum nor Sen proposes a metric for balancing claims across the entire 
social scheme. This in turn raises questions of  feasibility and social stability 
                                                 
23 On the idea of an “overlapping consensus” see Rawls 1996, 133-172. 
24 Nussbaum’s list (78-80) embraces a broad range of physical, intellectual, practical, emotional 
and imaginative capabilities that are central to our relationship to ourselves, to others, to 
animals, and to the natural world. 
25 For further discussions of resourcism and welfarism, and the sense in which Rawls is a 
resourcist, see Pogge 2002, 176f. and Stopford 2009, 21-2, 140-142. 
26 Nussbaum responds to such criticisms by arguing that the list of central capabilities specifies 
a “partial” rather than a full conception of the good for persons, and that functioning need be 
supported only up to a threshold below which truly human functioning is not available (2000, 
75, 211-212).  But the level of functioning is not at what is at stake. It is the legitimacy of the 
use of state resources to impose or enable human functioning at any level that is in question. In 
The Skillful Self  I take the view that the role of the central capabilities in questions of 
distributive justice can only be heuristic (Stopford 2009, 141-142).  
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(Pogge 2002, 206-209; Stopford 2009, 137-138). Such concerns are likely to be 
aggravated if  the ecological and economic constraints of  a low growth economy 
have to be taken into account.  
As we have seen, Aristotle’s theory of the household implies that the 
acquisition of wealth is circumscribed by a natural limit. Household wealth is not 
an end in itself but a means to a certain kind of life that is self-sufficient.27 It 
provides a model for flourishing within limits that distinguishes between life and 
the “good life,” treating the acquisition of household wealth as a means to the 
latter.  Aristotle believes that people grow “acquisitive” when they lose sight of 
their original reasons for acquiring wealth and, having failed to discover the good 
life, allow the pursuit of wealth to become their ruling activity.  
The resourcist’s view of the basis of social expectations echoes the view of 
wealth as an instrument. “Primary goods,” as Rawls calls them, are goods 
(obviously different in kind and scope from Aristotle’s conception of household 
wealth) that people know how to make use of in pursuing their conceptions of the 
good (Rawls 1971, 90-95). The capability approach, however, goes a step further 
than Aristotle or Rawls – perhaps a step too far – if it makes functioning the basis 
of social expectations (Stopford 2009, 138). This “step too far” diverts attention 
from a third factor relevant to the way human beings function, alongside 
resources and capabilities, namely the nonrepresentable skills (177-179).  
Skills are “representable” if they can be delegated to a third party without 
loss of function (for example when we pay a doctor to look after our health). There 
are, however, other cases in which skillful activity cannot be delegated without a 
loss of function (177). Capabilities can only be said to be “truly human” if they are 
grounded in skills that are nonrepresentable in this sense: that each person must 
acquire and cultivate them for themselves.28 It is by conceiving and executing a 
plan of our own making that we take the first and most important step towards 
acting in a truly human way.  
Because it is skillful, this first step is also already a step towards the capacity 
for rationality that is prefigured in what Kant calls the human “technical 
predisposition” (Kant 1978, 240; Sennett, 150).29 Both Kant and Aristotle, from 
                                                 
27 The word “wealth” here denotes the generic objects of a household economy in the sense of 
Aristotle, not money, riches or “net worth” in the modern sense.  On the translation and 
interpretation of αὐτάρκης see Meikle 1995, 44-45.  
 
28 On the semantics of  “capability” and “skill” see Stopford 2009, 146. 
29 The technical predisposition of mankind is illustrated by the capacity of the human hand to 
manipulate any object whatsoever. The hand is not confined to holding a particular kind of 
object or grasping a particular type of tool. Its freedom consists in the predisposition by which 
it can adapt to any object whatsoever. In this respect the human hand anticipates the 
flexibility of reason itself. Thus Kant writes in the Anthropology that “the characterization of 
man as a rational animal is found in the form and organization of the human hand, its fingers, 
and fingertips. Nature has made them partly through their construction, and partly through 
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their different perspectives, recognize that the human mind is formally flexible 
with regard to its objects. In the words of  Aristotle: η ψυχη τα òντα πως ὲστιν 
(Aristotle, 1907 III, 8, 431b20) - “Man’s soul is, in a certain way, entities.”30   
While for Aristotle this is an ontological fact, for Kant it is a state of  affairs that 
that can only be conceived in conjunction with the historical process by which 
humankind emerges from its roots in the animal world and develops the technical 
predisposition for realizing freely chosen ends (Allison 2012, 239, 250; Louden 
2011, xxv-xxvi). Culture is not the site of  a battle between bestializing and 
humanizing tendencies (Sloterdijk 2009, 15) but a gradual process by which a 
capacity for reason that is already prefigured in the manipulative abilities of  the 
human hand unfolds.31  Skill itself  is not moral, and the cultural, industrial and 
scientific achievements that it makes possible may embody both progressive and 
regressive elements.32 But a society that undermines the very feature of  culture 
that prefigures the human predisposition to reason can never be moral. 
Understanding the relationship between resources, capabilities and the 
nonrepresentable skills can throw light on the transition from a growth driven 
economy focused on consumption to a low growth economy which focuses on 
capability development “within limits.” Such a transition calls for a conception of  
prosperity that is consistent with sustainable levels of  economic activity and thus 
presupposes an acceptance and understanding of  limits. While the list of  
capabilities proposed by Nussbaum might provide a starting point for such a 
conception, Jackson argues that the capability approach must be “bounded” – 
that is to say that only ecological and economic resources consistent with a low or 
no economic growth scenario should be devoted to the development of  the core 
capabilities (Jackson 2000, 45). But what would it mean to promote human 
capabilities under such circumstances? How can we make sense of  the transition 
to a society that is no longer wedded to economic growth and is nevertheless 
prosperous? 
One clue to such a transition may be sought in the craft worker’s approach to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
their sensitivity, not only for manipulating objects in one particular way, but also in an open-
ended way. Nature has made them, therefore, fit to be used by reason, and thereby Nature has 
indicated the technological gift, or the gift for skill, of this species as that of a rational animal” 
(Kant 1978, 240). 
30 Quoted with this English translation in Heidegger 1962, 34. 
31 See Sloterdijk 2009, 15-16. Sloterdijk argues that the humanistic “taming of man” has failed. 
But the humanism he describes - one that involves initiation into an “intimate society of 
letters” as the key to the “calming of the inner beast” - is perfectionist. Sloterdijk does not 
consider the possibility of a – to paraphrase Rawls – “political not metaphysical” conception of 
education which, rather than dramatizing the contest of culture and barbarism, focuses on the 
cultivation of the raw materials of human nature, recognizing that the growth of culture is slow 
and its progress uneven.  
32 See, for example, Kant’s account of the “shining misery” to which the culture of skill leads 
(Kant 1987, §83). 
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resistances and limits. What Sennett calls the “material consciousness” of  the 
craftsman involves a kind of  “dialogue” through which the skilled worker 
voluntarily submits to the constraints of  their material (Sennett 2008, 168).  
Learning and applying a craft involves learning to deal with limits. Progress in 
skillful activity involves dealing with obstacles and material resistances that the 
craftsman must address and devise strategies to address. “Skill builds by moving 
irregularly, and sometimes by taking detours” (238). Sometimes the least obvious 
course or strategy is the right one, and sometimes the craft worker confronts 
obstacles that they have themselves introduced. (220-222). Dealing with 
resistances requires the craftsman to develop secondary skills such as patience and 
self-discipline (Stopford 2009, 176). 
Skills acquired in this way are nonrepresentable because each person must 
acquire and exercise them for themselves and one person cannot exercise them on 
behalf  of  another. “Thinking as making” and the “material consciousness” of  the 
craft worker involve the development of  nonrepresentable skills in a specific 
medium.33 To learn to overcome such obstacles through these and other strategies 
may involve a slow and continuous process of  development over many years. 
“Thinking as making”, as Aristotle would agree, is not the same as “thinking as 
doing.” To succeed the craft worker must learn to flourish within the limits of  the 
available.  
The craft worker’s encounter with obstacles and resistances has parallels in 
other kinds of skillful activity that do not yield products and artifacts but are 
nevertheless skillful (175-84). Health, bodily integrity, the capacity for affiliation, 
and many other capabilities depend on forms of skillful activity that are liable to 
run into obstacles and resistances in much the way craft work does (148-60).  
Skills do not exist in isolation from one other but form networks. Skills acquired in 
one area of a network may be transferred and adopted in others. Each type of 
skillful activity may break down, whether occasionally or systematically. When a 
skill breaks down, the entire network of mutually supporting skills connected with 
it is likely to be affected. We can think of each human being as the custodian of 
such a network of nonrepresentable skills that is theirs and theirs alone (177).  
What we discern here are the outlines of  a culture of  skill in which the 
craftsman’s slow, sometimes awkward, unpredictable and painstaking encounters 
with obstacles, resistances and limits provide a pattern for human flourishing 
within limits. Cultural progress is neither fast nor instinctive. Were it so, we would 
not enjoy the flexibility that allows us to interact with the world in an “open-
ended” way. Instead, human culture depends on a slow process of  “trial, practice 
                                                 
33 Sennett’s account of  “material consciousness” might be seen as an elaboration of  Heidegger’s 
(1927, §15) account of  Zuhandensein , though Sennett’s method is not phenomenological. 
Sennett uses the term “material consciousness” to signify not a “thematic” consciousness of  an 
object, but rather a “productive awareness” that is disclosed by dealing with a material and 
expressed through phrases such as “thinking with one’s hands” (Sennett 2008, 149-155). 
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and instruction” (Kant 1991, 42).  The skillful self  does not respond to a problem 
by giving up, but by trying a different approach or looking at a difficulty in a 
different light. Rather than abandoning its goals, it seeks new ways and means to 
achieve them. “Skillpower is not willpower, and in craft as in art it often takes a 
long time to get from A to B.”34  
In a culture of  skill people are concerned not with what they have but with 
what they have to do or what needs to be done. Such a culture is less susceptible 
than consumer culture to positional or “status goods” and unproductive status 
competition (Jackson 2009, 154-156) that adds “little or nothing to the levels of  
well-being” (53) and acts as a “material ‘ratchet’ that drives resources through the 
economy” (181).35 When the skillful self  is engaged with the task at hand it may 
not even notice other selves, far less compare itself  with them. To understand 
others as skillful selves is itself  a form of  skillful activity (Stopford 2009, 155). 
The others are encountered not as isolated individuals but in the context of  
activities in which we notice them because they too are engaged in doing 
something skillfully.  
The other is not someone who occupies the median position in a distribution 
or a consumer whose choices are mapped using demand curves, but a person who, 
like ourselves, has a task to do and does it more or less well. Rather than seeing 
others as economic agents whose material status we compare with our own, we see 
them in terms of  what they can do and be. When citizens develop a skillful 
understanding of  their own activities and have understood that others are also 
skillful selves who, like themselves, have their problems and obstacles to deal with, 
they are less likely to base their choices about how to live on the symbolic status 
of  material commodities to which they lack a skillful relationship. Status 
syndrome and status anxiety are signs that the skillful self  has lost touch with the 
essential context of  everyday skillful activity.36 The less dependent we are on 
status goods and unproductive status competition the more our participation in 
society can focus on needs that are “truly human.” 
A culture of  skill thus furnishes a framework of   less “materialistic” ways for 
people to participate in the life of  society, reducing our dependency on material 
growth and preparing the way for a readjustment of  the balance between 
investment, labour productivity and consumption (Jackson, 133-136).37  The 
restoration of  a public culture of  skill cannot by itself  resolve questions of  
distributive justice and basic entitlements. Such issues remain on the day to day 
political agenda. But such a culture is necessary to sustain the kind of  framework 
                                                 
34 Stopford 2011, 37 (author’s translation). The German text reads: „Die Kraft der Fähigkeiten 
ist keine Willenskraft, und im Handwerk wie in der Kunst braucht es oft eine lange Zeit, um 
von A nach B zu kommen.“ 
35 On consumer culture and the “iron cage” of consumerism see Jackson 2009, 87-102. 
36 On the essential role of contexts of purposes in use see Stopford 2009, 116-117.  
37 On the dimensions of globalization see e.g. Shaw (1999). 
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within which fairness is possible, holding bargaining and agreement about 
distributive shares and entitlements to within a manageable range, and laying the 
foundation for the reasonable management of  social expectations.  
Political communities that wish to encourage the development of  a culture of  
skill must thus seek ways to resist the marginalization of  skill that has become a 
systematic feature of  modern civilization. This does not require us to oppose the 
“chief  dimensions of  globalization,” but it does involve the search for 
configurations of  economic and technological development that are consistent 
with a culture of  skill and grounded in a democratic critique of  technological 
rationality (Stopford 2009, 7-8, 123-132). This may, in turn, lead to a political 
conception of  prosperity that reflects a skillful understanding of  what it means to 
flourish within limits, and from this position begin to address the dilemma of  
growth with which ecologically challenged societies are faced. 
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